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Gaming modeling of self-enforcing agreements and free-rider problem 
Abstract 
The paper justifies the selection of formal conditions under which the rational-
minded actors will tend to observe the implicit contract between them. 
Self-enforcing agreements are characterized by inappropriateness of arbitration 
support, primarily due to too high transaction costs of such support. 
It is an underdeveloped area of research of self-enforcing agreements does not 
operate categories of reputation directly. The question is: can there be such conditions 
for the relationship of agents, in which compliance with the agreement will be 
beneficial to both of them without them having a priori information? 
As the main method for research the problem selected the game theory. Is 
constructed the game model of subjects’ relationships and found the value of the 
payment functions for which there is Nash equilibrium in pure strategies “to comply 
with agreement“. 
It is shown, that above game simulate the relationship of agents, which can 
lead to a free-rider problem in the theory of collective goods. That is the solution of 
this game is also a solution to the free-rider problem, that demonstrate the dual tasks 
of self-enforcing agreements and the free-rider problem in the allocation of collective 
goods. 
The novelty of the study results is to obtain an analytical expression for the 
automatic compliance with the agreement conditions by rationally acting cognitively 
perfect agents and formal proof of their adequacy. 
The ability to analyze the behavior of economic agents in matters of free-riding 
by simple formal tools of the game theory makes presented results useful from a 
practical point of view. 
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Introduction 
The paper justifies the selection of formal conditions under which rational-
minded actors will tend to compliance with the agreement between them, because the 
final result is more profitable for them. 
The problem in different contexts is covered in theory of self-enforcing 
agreements that along with theory of implicit (incomplete) contracts is one of the 
main branches of generally contract theory. At this, different researchers either range 
self-enforcing contracts assign to class of implicit contracts or equate to them (see 
e.g., (Hart, 1987). 
Literature review 
Over the past few decades, the various concepts of the contract have been 
stabilized and offered a number of classifications. One of the main is division of all 
the contracts into three groups: agency contracts (contract type “principal – agent” – a 
contract of employment, as well as its generalization to the agents’ “horizontal” 
relations – the contract of sale), incomplete (implicit) and implicit contracts (self-
enforcing agreement). At this 
1) subject of analysis theory of agency contracts is usually the effects of the 
information’s asymmetric that is inherent in the relations of the parties to 
agreement (see (Grossman and Hart, 1983), (Holmstrom, 1979), (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1982), (Mirrlees, 1976), (Ross, 1973), (Shavell, 1979), (Stiglitz, 1974)); 
2) theory of incomplete contracts research, on the one hand, opportunism ex post, 
that caused by transaction costs (Williamson, 1971) and is typical for the like 
agreements, and on the other hand – difficulty of detection of compliance by the 
parties with their contractual responsibilities (see (Grossman and Hart, 1986), 
(Hart and Moore, 1988)); 
3) object of theory of implicit (self-enforcing) agreements is conditions and 
mechanism their automatic compliance, the necessity is caused by the miss 
(imperfection) of clearly (legal) prescribed a mechanism to enforce the agreement, 
its control and sanctions for evasion it. 
The problem of self-enforcing agreements holds an important place in the new 
institutional economics. Unlike other self-enforcing agreements does not legal 
contract. Such agreements arise because of imperfection of the legal system that don’t 
has enough resources for provide the compliance enforcing agreements between 
economic agents. However the legal details don’t subject of proposed article, so the 
reason of use of self-enforcing agreements can be formulated in more accordance 
with research area: external, arbitration support of agreements is inexpedient 
primarily economically – because of the excessive transaction costs of such support. 
The activation of researches self-enforcing agreements usually to start from 
articles Telser (1980), Klein and Leffler (1981), in which behavior of agents was 
postulate as quite rational – maximizing individual utility. That is, an agent 
compliance with existing contract only if he obtains economic benefit, otherwise he 
avoids compliance responsibilities. No other factors are influence his behavior (see 
(Telser, 1980), (Williamson, 1971)). It is noted that like argumentation, is based on a 
matching of benefits with costs, used also Coleman (1994) and Frank (1992, 152). 
In other informal approach [that it was] proposed by Akerlof, implicit contract 
regards rather for not allocation of risk, and behavioral norms. Akerlof consider the 
relationship around employment contract as exchange of gifts, based a certain extent 
on endogenic behavior’s norms (Akerlof, 1982). Among others also could distinguish 
article by Scott (2003), in which he proposes self-enforcing of implicit agreements. 
Applications using of theoretical developments in the field self-enforcing 
agreements, first of all, relating to the salary theory and the labor markets (see 
(Carmichael, 1989), (Lazear, 1979; 1981), (Okun, 1981)), and to the research of 
relationships economic agents at macro level in the cases of easing or full absence of 
government intervention (e.g. (Kronman, 1985). In last article Kronman with help of 
simple model shows implicit contract that support efficiency trade agreements with 
laissez faire. In a later work Srinivasan and Brush (2006) consider self-enforcing 
agreements between supplier and buyer in context vertical alliances. 
On the ground of above approach Akerlof concludes salary and standards of 
employer's efforts are interrelated (Akerlof, 1982, 544). 
Also trade relations with asymmetric information researched Kreps and Wilson 
(1982), Milgrom and Roberts (1982). 
Usually, in models of self-enforcing agreements consider contractors and 
referee (e.g. government) are unable to: 
 determine, did be the agreement evasion; 
 enforce the agreements (regarding it is the most often assumed compliance with 
the agreements is induced by the explicit or implicit threat of them 
discontinuation) (see (Telser, 1980), (Stiglitz, 1974)). 
In addition, it is assumed almost perfect information in relationship – none of 
parties of the agreement know, is his vis-à-vis fair? 
Under such conditions there is important to accumulate information about the 
history of behavior of potential parties to the agreement in similar situations and to 
present similar information about own reputation regarding compliance with the 
agreements. Because of this the theory of self-enforcing agreements is largely based 
on reputation’s concept (e.g. a brand of firm etc.). Klein and Leffler in above said 
article (Klein and Leffler, 1981) where first accented special attention to role of 
reputation in consideration of self-enforcing agreements. Shapiro (1983) developed 
the model of Klein and Leffler by formalizing the concept of reputational 
equilibrium. 
As discussed reputation formed by repeated actions of agents (firstly, this 
interaction), it is natural to use the theory of repeated game to researching “reputation 
models”. 
This approach presents Bull (1987) (the problem of implicit labour contracts 
and a role of reputation in increase of completeness of the agreement), Kreps (1990), 
Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987), who used games with infinite number of 
repetitions for solving boundary problems. See the example of game-theoretical 
interpretation of effective salary e.g. (Gibbons, 1992, 107). 
At once, it is still an underdeveloped line of research of self-enforcing 
agreements categories, and reputation does not operate directly. The question is: are 
there such conditions of relationship of agents, in which compliance with the 
agreement is beneficial to them without them having and accumulation a priori 
additional information (e.g. reputation of vis-à-vis) and don’t it by repeated 
interaction? I.e. are there conditions both rational agents stand by an agreement from 
first step of relationship. 
Actually, this article purpose is to solve this problem. 
Method’s and Models 
The game theory, which is the most appropriate tool for the problems of this 
type, has been selected as the main method for investigating the problem. 
Firstly, the different direct of Contract theory, particular models “principal – 
agent”, use actively game theory. At this in theory “principal – agent” line of 
research, in which numerically evaluating eventual opportunism (total or partial) of 
agent (first of all) and of principal is difficult, is not well developed. Sometime 
careful and exact evaluation of degree of opportunism of agent by principal (and vice 
versa) is so much costly that it is economically unprofitable. At this obtained in 
consequence of interaction of principal and agent result is determined quite 
accurately. This case pretty much corresponds to self-enforcing agreements between 
principal and agent description. 
Second, as noted above, theory of self-enforcing (implicit) agreements use the 
method repeated games for modelling interaction of contractors to create of own 
reputation and of study of reputation of vis-à-vis. 
As self-enforcing agreements can describe not only “vertical” (“principal –
 agent”) also “horizontal” interaction of equal partners, it is offered game model the 
same relationship of economic agents. In this case “vertical” relationship is the 
subcase of “horizontal” ones and do not need a separate modeling. 
Following the formal model is constructed for interaction between 2 parties, 
but the conclusion can extend to any number of contractors. 
Free-rider problem. Self-enforce of agreement assume lack of control of 
eventual opportunism of agents, that is income distribution does not depend, the 
agents compliance with the agreement or they evade one. 
Is considered simple case of the interaction 2 agents: both agents are potential 
investors that agree to invest in some process in defined proportions n1:n2 (be definite 
it is assumed n1>n2). 
Assume the process is multiplier, that is after 1 turnover he multiplies the funds 
invested by coefficient α (α>1). 
Naturally, agents distribute earned revenue in the same proportions n:m. 
Extreme strategies (pure-strategies) of behavior of agents are such: agent can 
comply the agreement (investing respectively n1 or n2 costs’ units), and can evade it, 
investing nothing. Also he can partly evade (and partly comply) the agreement, 
investing 1 10 n   or 2 20 n   units. That is in general strategies of agents are as 
follows: 
1 1
2 2
1: 0 ;
2 : 0 .
n
n


 
 
      (1) 
Nevertheless eventual agreement avoiding by one or both agents, principled 
lack of control causes the income distribution in proportion n:m for any real 
investment amount of agents. 
Is set a problem: find value of parameters n1, n2, α: rational agents–maximizers 
observe the agreement, i.e. they full invest the process. 
Considering foregoing conditions, can be described the profits of agents if they 
use extreme mutual strategies (the markings: 0 – total investment evasion; 1 – total 
investment according to the agreement): 
 (0; 0): both agents avoid investing. The total investment identically zero, hence the 
revenue is equals also 0 0   . Because the agents don’t suffered costs (don’t 
invested), their profits are: 
 
 
1: 0;0 0 0 0;
2 : 0;0 0 0 0;
g
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 (0; 1): 1th agent (let it is potentially bigger investor) avoid the investment, 2th – 
fair invests agreed value n2. Obviously total investment both agents is also n2, the 
revenue equals m , the revenues of agents distribute as follows: 
 
1
2
1 2
2
2
1 2
1: ;
2 : ;
n
n
n n
n
n
n n




 
the profits of agents are equals: 
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 (1; 0): the situation is symmetrical previous one: 1th agent fully invests agreed 
funds, 2th fully avoid the investment, acting as a free-rider. Obviously the profits 
of contractors also are the symmetrical in relation to previous case: 
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 (1; 1): both agents fully comply own commitments under the value of funds. Total 
investment is equal to 1 2n n , total revenue is:  1 2n n  , revenues of agents 
are:  1 1 2
1 2
n
n n
n n
 

 and  2 1 2
1 2
n
n n
n n
 

 or 1n  and 2n  , and ones profits 
are: 
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Let’s establish the relationship of agents as the game: 
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. (2) 
In this formulation self-enforcing agreement by both agents corresponds to 
existence unique in the game (2) Nash’ equilibrium with the use of mutual strategy 
(1; 1), that is compliance with these conditions: 
   1 2 1 21 2
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Considering n1>n2 and in the first (conjunction) and in the second (disjunction) 
pair the second inequalities majorize first ones, that is 
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On rearrangements there is: 
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Because 2 1
1 2
n n
n n
 , the first inequality majorize the second, finally be obtained 
the unique Nash’ equilibrium condition for game (2): 
1
2
1
n
n
  .       (4) 
Inequality (4) shows that to invest in an agreed value is profitable for agents 
(i.e. it is case that every agent make a maximum possible profit versus other cases), if 
the ratio them investment does not exceed the profitability of the process. That is 
even with equal deposits from investors the multiplier should be ≥2. 
If the multiplier is less than ratio of investment payment, do this means that 
self-enforce of agreement is inaccessible? 
The multiplier coefficient α define the productivity of process per 1 turnover. 
Clear the multiplier repeated process is equal ατ, where τ – amount of repeats of 
process. If α>1, then 
1
2
: 1,2, : 1
n
n
      . 
That is if agents will arrange not income distribution during τ turnovers then 
maximizing strategy for them will be the investments in agreed values. 
Discussion 
The following explanation are possible, why do not all agreement in real 
economy realized automatically? 
1. Not every agent can and wants to wait during τ turnovers. But then it is not clar 
why in general do such agent agrees to make an agreement? 
2. More convincing is argument about the insecurity of result of production process – 
the multiplier’s function will not necessary stably and at each turn will multiply 
the income by α (formally is suffices a weaker condition: at every step the 
incomes could increase as much the formed sequence of quantities of incomes 
tends as    to 1
2
: 1
n
N N
n
   – sure will be found a timepoint when 
received required profitability). The desire to insure against a risk can tempt 
someone of agents to opportunist behavior. 
3. The agent has cognitive limitations – he bad knows how to count. Based on 
“common sense” or certain routines he consider that unpunished opportunism 
always give more profit than fair compliance with the agreement (especially as 
real life has many evidence of this view). Therefore at the first opportunity the 
agent, that is aware about the lack of control and sanctions for agreement evasion, 
will try to evade the agreement and not to invest, it without realizing that he 
chooses an economically ineffective behavior strategy. 
Separately, above game that simulates relationship of equal (in general) 
partners (it completely concerns to special case – relationship “principal – agent”), is 
also the model of relationship of contractors that could cause free-rider problem in 
the theory of collective (public, club, common-pool) goods
1
. That is the solution such 
game is also the solution free-rider problem by indication system parameters in which 
rational agent it is not profitable to become a free-rider. This conclusion follow from 
what free-rider problem arise just if it is difficult or even impossible to determinate 
the amount of contributions of each contractors or if the agreement evasion each 
contractors it is difficult or of even impossible to prevent – just like conditions are 
determinant to identify self-enforcing agreements. 
Therefore the proposed game model allows uniting the problems of 
enforcement of self-enforcing agreements and the issue of motivation potential free-
riders to non-opportunistic behavior. 
Conclusion 
Therefore because in modelling of game 2 equitable agents established the 
contractors essentially don’t control eventual mutually opportunism, the game solves 
the issues formal conditions of self-enforce of agreement between this agents. 
The novelty of the study results is to obtain an analytical expression for the 
self-enforce the agreement conditions by rationally acting cognitively perfect agents 
and formal proof of their adequacy. There is demonstrated the dual tasks of self-
enforcing agreements and the free-rider problem in the allocation of collective goods. 
The proof of the tasks duality of seemingly different fields of study (theory of 
contracts and market failure) suggests the existence of common roots of these areas, 
                                           
1
 The term “collective [consumption] good” used, in particular, Samuelson (1954) and Graves 
(2009). 
which in itself is the certain scientific result in these areas of institutional economic 
theory. At the same time, the ability to analyze the behavior of economic agents, for 
example, in matters of free-riding by relatively simple but quite formal tools of the 
game theory makes results presented in the paper useful from a practical point of 
view. 
The main direction of this problem’s further development is its generalization 
for an arbitrary number of interacting entities, i.e. expansion of the self-enforcing 
agreement to the interaction of m of contractors: the construction of the model and 
the proof of the adequacy of the obtained values of the relationship system’s 
parameters. It is also interesting to analyze the possibility to achieve practically 
conditions for self-enforcing of agreements between agents in terms of specific 
practical problems of the real economy, e.g. in the areas of environmental-economic 
management, administration, etc. 
 
  
 Reference 
Akerlof, G. A., 1982. Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 97, pp. 543-569. 
Bernheim, B. D. Peleg, B. and Whinston, M. D., 1987. Coalition-Proof Nash 
Equilibria I. Concepts. Journal of Economic Theory, 12(1), pp. 1-12. 
Bull, C., 1987. The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 98, pp. 147-159. 
Carmichael, H. L., 1989. Self-Enforcing Contracts, Shirking, and Life Cycle 
Incentives. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3(4), pp. 65-83. 
Coleman, J. S., 1994. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge: Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, 993 p. 
Frank, R. H., 1992. Melding Sociology and Economics: James Coleman's 
Foundations of Social Theory. Journal of Economic Literature, 30, pp. 147-170. 
Gibbons, R., 1992. A Primer in Game Theory. New York: Harvester, 288 p. 
Graves, P. E., 2009. A Note on the Valuation of Collective Goods: Overlooked 
Input Market Free Riding for Non-Individually Incrementable Goods, The B. E. 
Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 9(1), pp. 1-20. 
Grossman, S. J. and Hart, O. D., 1983. An Analysis of the Principal Agent 
Problem. Econometrica, 51, pp. 7-46. 
Grossman, S. J. and Hart, O. D., 1986. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: 
A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. Journal of Political Economy, 94, pp. 
691-719. 
Hart, O. D., 1987. Incomplete Contracts. In: Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., and 
Newman, P. eds. The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, London: 
Macmillan. V.2, pp. 752-759. 
Hart, O. D. and Moore, J., 1988. Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation. 
Econometrica, 56, pp. 755-785. 
Holmstrom, B. R., 1979. Moral Hazard and Observability. Belt Journal of 
Economics, 10, pp. 74-91. 
Klein, B. and Leffler, К. B., 1981. The Role of Market Forces in Assuring 
Contractual Performance. Journal of Political Economy, 89, pp. 615-641. 
Kreps, D. M. and Wilson, R., 1982. Reputation and Imperfect Information. 
Journal of Economic Theory, 27, pp. 253-279. 
Kreps, D. M., 1990. Corporate Culture and Economic Theory. In: Alt, J. E., 
and Shepsle, K. A. eds. Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 90-143. 
Kronman, A. T., 1985. Contract Law and the State of Nature. Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization, 1, pp. 5-32. 
Lazear, E. P., 1979. Why Is There Mandatory Retirement? Journal of Political 
Economy, 87, pp. 1261-1284. 
Lazear, E. P., 1981. Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours 
Restrictions. American Economic Review, 71, pp. 606-620. 
Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J., 1982. Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence. 
Journal of Economic Theory, 27, pp. 280-312. 
Mirrlees, J. A., 1976. The Optimal Structure of Incentives with Authority 
within an Organization. Bell Journal of Economics, 7, pp. 105-131. 
Okun, A. M., 1981. Prices and Quantities: A Macroeconomic Analysis. 
Oxford: Blackwell, 382 p. 
Ross, S., 1973. The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. 
American Economic Review, 63, pp. 134-139. 
Samuelson, P. A., 1954. The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 36(4), pp. 387-389, doi: 10.2307/1925895. 
Scott, R. E., 2003. A theory of self-enforcing indefinite Agreements. Columbia 
Law Review, 103(7), pp. 1641-1699. 
Shapiro, C., 1983. Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to 
Reputations. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 97, pp. 659-679. 
Shavell, S., 1979. Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal Agent 
Relationship. Bell Journal of Economics, 80, pp. 55-73. 
Srinivasan, R. and Brush, T. H., 2006. Supplier Performance in Vertical 
Alliances: The Effects of Self-Enforcing Agreements and Enforceable Contracts. 
Organization science, 17(4), pp. 436-452. 
Stiglitz, J. E., 1974. Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping. Review of 
Economic Studies, 41, pp. 219-255. 
Telser, L. G., 1980. A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements. Journal of 
Business, 53(1), pp. 27-44. 
Williamson, O. E., 1971. The Vertical Integration of Production: Market 
Failure Considerations. American Economic Review, 1971, 61(2), 112-123. 
 
